This paper explores the relationships between legislative, local and European voting behaviour in Portugal, 1975Portugal, -2004 The main conclusion is that relations between second-order and first-order elections reflect not only short term, but also long term effects.
INTRODUCTION: MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER
The aim of this paper is to explore the relations between legislative, local and European elections in Portugal during the democratic period. In the next section, we will make a brief introduction to the Portuguese political system. Considering the relative importance of the different bodies for its functioning, we would argue that local, regional and European elections are second-order national elections, while legislative contests are of the first-order type. We use the definition of first-order and second-order national elections that is now standard in the literature (Reif, 1985b; and Reif and Schmitt, 1980 ; see also Marsh and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; and Norris, 1997) .
First order elections are those where there is much at stake, that is, the control of national executive power. This means that in parliamentary systems, legislative elections are first-order, as are elections for the head of state in presidential regimes. On the contrary, second-order national elections have no direct impact on the control of national executive power.
The relationship between parliamentary and presidential elections in semipresidential systems is more problematic. For example, in describing the French 5 th Republic, also a semi-presidential system, Reif considered that both presidential and legislative elections are first-order, except in certain circumstances (Reif, 1985b ; see also Marsh, 1998) . However, semi-presidential systems are in reality quite varied. In some of them -France, Finland, Poland, and Lithuania-the role of the president is very strong; namely she/he has the power to propose legislation, call for referendums and preside over the council of ministers (this is where the president is the head of government, at least under some circumstances, not co-habitation). While in other systems-Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, Slovenia, Romania and Portugal after its 1982 constitutional revision-the president has only very limited control over the executive power (Freire and Magalhães, 2002, pp. 71-91, and Appendix C) . So, in the latter cases we cannot say that presidential and legislative election results are of equal importance for the functioning of the political system, because they are not.
Parliamentary elections are clearly more important. So, we must conclude that Reif's classification is neither very suitable for the Portuguese case, nor for other weak, semipresidential systems. Moreover, at least in Portugal, the rationale of the competition and the actors contesting presidential elections has not always been the same as in the legislative elections, namely in terms of the left-right divide (see Freire, 2004) . Because of all this we will concentrate the analysis mainly on the comparisons between legislative versus local and EP elections.
But how are first and second-order elections related in Portugal? The first objective of the paper is to compare the evolution of the party system and aggregate levels of electoral volatility (total and inter-bloc) across different types of elections. Due to the well known limitations of aggregate measures of volatility, we will compare the individual levels of social and ideological anchors of partisanship across different types of elections (local and European versus legislative) -an individual level surrogate for inter-bloc volatility.
The second objective of the paper is to test theories on electoral cycles, comparing aggregate electoral returns across legislative, local and EP elections in different periods of the national electoral cycle, and using as the baseline the winners in each previous legislative election. The hypothesis to be tested here is whether secondorder elections have a singular character or whether they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent towards the national government.
In the beginning of each section of the paper the literature on secondorderelections will be reviewed, and the paper's contribution to what we already know about these type of elections and their relations with first-order ones will be defined.
But there are three major methodological contributions of the paper to which we can refer in advance. Empirical studies on second-order elections in the European context have usually compared legislative and EP elections, and have usually lacked a longitudinal perspective. Using only Portuguese electoral data , we intend to overcome some of these two shortcomings of prior studies, extending comparisons to more types of second-order elections and introducing a long-run perspective. The latter is used in order to see if there is any structural influence of national legislative contests on second-order elections, namely in terms of trends in the party system format.
The third specific contribution of the paper is the use of a single country, with very similar electoral systems in the different types of elections (except for the presidential ones) -see below-, which will allow us to test all hypotheses in a systematic way, while controlling for other institutional, cultural, social and political factors that can get in the way of clear comparisons between first and second-order elections.
In addition, looking at second order elections can add to our knowledge and understanding of the Portuguese political and party systems. First, we can understand what is the effective role of second order elections in the function of the political system. In what ways do these types of elections in Portugal reflect specific logics (local or European)? And what is the role of national factors in Portuguese second-order elections? Are they merely "barometer elections" (Anderson and Ward, 1996) ? Second, we know that since 1987 there is a majoritarian drive in legislative elections (and in the national political system as a whole) (Bruneau et al, 2001; Lopes and Freire, 2002, pp. 179-183) . But is this trend also present in second-order elections? In other words, is there any long-term impact of first-order elections on second-order ones? Third, can analysing second-order elections tell us anything about the sophistication of the Portuguese voters? For example, as elsewhere in Europe, do Portuguese voters use second-order elections to send signs to national governments? And what is the role of ideological factors in first and second-order elections? We will try to answer all these questions in the following sections.
1 But first, let us begin with some contextual information.
THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Prior to Portugal's relatively bloodless Revolution of Carnations on April 25, 1974, free and fair elections with universal suffrage and a competitive party system were unheard of in the nation. Portugal's transition to democracy was initiated by a coup led by junior military officers, who committed themselves to holding free and fair, popular elections one year from the date of coup. The Portuguese Constituent Assembly elections were held on schedule on April 25, 1975, and these were followed by the first free constitutional legislative elections one year later, on April 25, 1976.
Portugal's political system is semi-presidential (Duverger, 1980) , and thus the only two institutions with national electoral legitimacy and a responsibility for forming government are the President of the Republic (PR) and the National Assembly. The
Head of State is the directly-elected president, but this officeholder must share power with a Head of Government (prime minister) who is responsible to the National Assembly. Although the president had more significant powers from 1976 to1982, leading to an unclear "presidential-parliamentary" balance of power, the 1982 revision of the Constitution substantially reduced some of these powers, thereby making the system more "premier-presidential" (Shugart and Carey, 1992, Ch. 2) . The presidential term is 5 years with a maximum of two terms. Since its transition to democracy began in 1974, Portugal has had six presidential elections, only one of which required a second-round runoff.
The legislative branch, the National Assembly, is unicameral and composed of 230 members elected in 22 multi-member constituencies (we present the electoral systems used in all four types of elections below). Deputies' terms are a four year maximum. National legislative elections ultimately determine which party will form the Government, who will become prime minister, and thus who will share executive power with the president. These are clearly the most important elections in the political system.
Less important elections (in terms of their contribution to the functioning of the national political system) also take place in Portugal at the local, regional and European levels. Local and regional elections under democratic rules only began in 1976, following the promulgation of Portugal's new Constitution. The document provided for 3 distinct levels of local governance (autarquias locais) according to their respective territorial delimitations-the ward (freguesia), the county-level municipality (concelho), and the special administrative regions of the Azores and Madeira. In this paper, we will refer only to local elections, because regional elections are not held in the whole country. (1975-87: 11,4; 1991-02: 10,5) , the reverse is true.
On the other hand, it clearly can be said that the EP electoral system benefits small and medium-sized parties the most because fewer resources are needed for electoral campaigns in a single district.
Local elections are fought in 308 municipalities. In Portuguese local elections there are two types of contests: first, at the municipal level, for the executive and for the assembly; second, at the ward level, for the assembly -from which the ward's executive emanates. We consider only the most important of local elections, i.e., those for the municipal executive (Câmara Municipal). These elections are fought in medium/small districts -the average district magnitude in the 1997 elections was 6.56 seats -and so the system works against smaller parties. Furthermore, a large amount of resources (human, financial, and organizational) are needed to campaign in all 308 units, and this is yet another feature that works against smaller parties--especially those that lack a strong, organizational structure at the national level. Another singularity of local elections for the municipal executive is that they are highly personalized. This is due to the fact that although people vote in closed lists, campaigns revolve around the mayoral candidates.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS
Portuguese democratic politics have been dominated by four parties (see Figure   1 ; for details, see Bruneau, 1997) Figure 1 under the labels of "others left" and "others right." The two major parties (PS and PSD) have always controlled government, be it in a single party format (PS: 1976-77; 1995 PSD: 1985 PSD: -1995 or in coalition (PS-CDS: 1977 -1978 PSD-CDS-PPM 3 : 1979-83; PS-PSD: 1983-85 ; PSD-CDS-PP:
2002-present date) (see Table 1 ). Between 1976 and 1985, governments were mainly of a coalition type and never completed their terms (see Table 1 Following theories on second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Franklin, 1996a and 1996b; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996) , the first thing to be tested is if small ("others left" and "others right") and medium-size (PCP and CDS) parties have always performed better in Portuguese second-order elections (local and EP) than in first-order ones (legislative). The second question is whether the trend towards bipolarization in first-order elections is also present in second-order elections.
( Table 2 period also for the latter contests -the corresponding values are shown in parenthesis in Table 2 (last column). Looking at Table 2 we can clearly see that the two largest parties (PS and PSD) almost always performed better in first-order elections than in secondorder ones. The only exception is in the 1980s, when the average vote percentage of the two major parties was smaller in legislative elections than in local elections. This exception is due to the fact that the new party, PRD, was not as successful in local elections, and at the national level the success of this party was at the cost of the PS'
share. So, large parties usually performed better in first-order elections, as expected.
However, the difference is not very impressive for the comparison between local and legislative elections. For the whole period ) the two largest parties averaged 69.2% of the vote for legislative elections, and 68.1% for local elections. As mentioned before, to make a proper comparison between European and legislative elections, we should only consider the 1980s-2000s average vote for the latter: 72,3; so, in this latter case the difference is rather more relevant than in the case of local elections. The not very impressive difference between the performance of larger parties in legislative vis-à-vis local elections is probably due to the fact that the electoral system in local elections works more in favour of the larger parties, due to a much lower average district magnitude vis-à-vis legislative elections. Moreover, the resources needed to campaign in around 300 counties also tends to produce the same bias. From this perspective, the slight difference in larger parties' performance in legislative vis-à-vis local elections actually become more relevant.
Medium-sized (PCP and CDS) parties always performed better in second-order than in first-order elections, although in the 2000s the differences between EP and legislative elections are very small (see Table 2 ). In the case of medium-sized parties, the differences for the whole period are specially relevant when we consider the contrast between legislative (21,7) and local (25,4) elections; comparing legislative (19, 4) and European (21, 6) elections the difference is much lower. So, the latter differences in vote percentages are not particularly impressive, but they are also in the expected direction.
The smaller parties ("others left and right") only perform better in European (6, 6 for the whole period) than in legislative elections (4,0 for 1980s-2000s ). When we compare legislative (4,7 for 1970s-2000s ) with local elections (2,9) the reverse is true.
These differences are probably due to the electoral systems associated with each type of second-order election (average district magnitude is much lower in local elections than in EP contests, so the latter are less unfair to tiny parties), but also to the differences in the resources (human, financial and organizational) needed to fight local and EP legislative ones), where CDS performed better than PCP. The better performance of PCP in local elections might be due to two major factors: first, the existence of strong PCP electoral fiefs in the Southern areas (both urban and rural); second, the strength of its party organization (Lopes and Freire, 2002) . Explaining the better performance of CDS in EP elections is more difficult, specially because there have only been five EP elections to date. However, poorer PCP performance might be due to a stronger anti-EU stance than the CDS. But this hypothesis needs comparative data to be tested. So, in terms of the performance of different types of Portuguese political parties, theories about first and second-order elections usually receive empirical support. But did the developments in the party system that occurred for legislative elections also take place in second-order elections (local and EP)? Figure 2 shows the trends in the "effective number of electoral parties" (legislative, local and EP elections) in Portuguese democratic elections. The "effective number of parties" measure is taken form Laakso and Taagepera (1979) , and elaborated using official Portuguese electoral data.
Comparing first-order ( 
LEVELS OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AND SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL

ANCHORS OF PARTISANSHIP ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS
In this section it will be tested if electors are more likely to change their vote options in elections with less importance (local and European) than in the most important ones (legislative). This hypothesis will be tested both with aggregate and individual level data.
At the aggregate level, the concepts of total and inter bloc electoral volatility will be used (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, pp. 17-52 and 313-314) . Considering that second-order elections might be used by voters to express their discontent to the government in place, and considering that these elections have no direct consequences for national government formation, it is possible that voters feel more free to change their vote options in second-order elections than in first-order ones. We expect that this might happen both in terms of vote swings within the same ideological quadrant (intra bloc volatility) and between the left-right boundary (inter bloc volatility). Note that the sum of intra and inter bloc volatility gives us total volatility.
Let us begin by presenting the operational definitions. First, total electoral volatility (TV) can be expressed as:
where PiV represents the change -in absolute terms -in the aggregate vote for party in between two consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 20 , italicized as in the original).
Note that PiV to PnV represents all parties competing and receiving votes in at least one of the two consecutive elections. Following Bartolini and Mair (1990: 20) , we measured each party vote as a percentage of the total valid vote. The index is divided by two "on the assumption that accumulated net gains are equal to accumulated net losses" and also to make the index's interpretation more intuitive: as it is it ranges from 0 to 100, instead of from 0 to 200 if it were not divided by 2.
Bartolini and Mair have already discussed in detail some of the methodological issues involved with the creation of this and other volatility indices (1990, pp. 20-22 In any case, let us move on to the inter bloc volatility (BV) formula, which can be expressed as:
Where P(iV + jV + kV) represents the net change -in absolute terms -in the aggregate vote for parties i, j, and k, all of which come from the same bloc, between two consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 22 , italics as in the original).
The constitutive logic of the measure is the same as for TV, only now it is applied to blocs of parties and not to parties taken individually (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 22 ).
we applied the BV formula to measure electoral shifts between the left and right blocs of Portuguese parties in two consecutive elections, as is the case with Bartolini and Mair (1990, pp. 22-47 and 313-314) . Since this political cleavage is linked both to the class and religious cleavage in Portugal, BV can also be taken as a measure of change across both class and religious cleavage boundaries. How should these mainly negative findings be interpreted? Two major kinds of explanations are possible, and these are not necessarily contradictory. The first one is more analytical. Only small segments of the electorate are using second-order elections to express their discontent with the existing national government in place. The others segments of the electorate usually vote "sincerely" in second-order elections, i.e., for those parties they prefer the most without any tactical and/or protestative considerations (about the "sincere vote" in second-order elections, see Ejik and Franklin, 1996b; Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996) . On the contrary, tactical considerations may be much greater in first-order elections among larger parts of the electorate, and so the result is usually higher volatility in first-order elections. Figures 4 and 5) . But we know from prior studies (Campbell, 1960, and 1993; Eijk and Franklin, 1996c ) that one of the major determinants of the different outcomes in first and second-order elections is turnout. Thus, the differences in the relative strength in the anchors of partisanship across elections might be due to differential turnout; those participating in second-order elections might be more sophisticated voters Comparing the vote in legislative (1987 and 1991) and European (1989 and elections using the Eurobarometer data, 11 we can see again that the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are always more important in first-order elections than in second-order ones--adjusted R 2 are 0.552 and 0.423 versus 0.504 and 0.381, respectively (Table 3a ). These differences are less dramatic than those found between Local (2001) and Legislative (2002) elections, but they are very important because the 1987 election was a highly volatile one, both in terms of TV and BV, and most of all the aggregated measures revealed much higher values for the legislative than for EP elections. However, the regression equations for legislative elections were re-run including only those who voted in both elections: EP and legislative. The evidence shows that the picture stayed the same in the 1987 (0.554), but not in the 1991 election (0.381), which now is about equal to the 1994 EP election. So, only in the latter case do the differences in the strength of the anchors of partisanship seem to be due to differential turnout.
Vis-à-vis our previous article on this subject (Freire, 2004) , in the present paper we are now able to add survey data comparing the 1999 elections, legislative ( In our previous article (Freire, 2004 , p. ??) we concluded the following: "despite our analysis of only a limited set of elections, the individual level evidence allows us to conclude that people are more prone to change their vote across party blocs in secondorder elections than in first-order ones. However, sometimes these differences between first-order and second-order elections might be due to differential turnout." However, the analysis of new 1999 and 2004 survey data force us to change our previous conclusions. Now, we must conclude that the individual level evidence allows us to infer that sometimes people are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs in second-order elections than in first-order ones; in other occasions, the reverse is true. So, we must conclude that the phenomena is mainly dependent on the political conjuncture.
ELECTORAL CYCLES AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS
The hypothesis to be tested in this section is if second-order elections have a singular character or if they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent with national government (Tufte, 1975; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Oppenhuis, Ejik and Franklin, 1996; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996; Marsh, 1998 ). This will be done by comparing aggregate electoral results across legislative, local and EP elections in different periods of the electoral cycle, using as the baseline the winners in each previous (or concurrent) legislative election (Table 4 ).
Before proceeding with the analysis three major issues must be clarified. First, how can the dependent variable be measured? The dependent variable is the change in vote percentage for the party (or parties) that control the national government between the prior first-order elections (legislative) and the subsequent (or concurrent) secondorder election (local or European) (a similar strategy as that used by Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b ; for a different approach in the US context, see Tufte, 1975) .
Second, it is necessary to decide how to define and classify the different parts of the electoral cycle. The notion of electoral cycle is related to the idea that during any national government's existence there are popularity cycles with differential political consequences depending on the time elapsed between the first-order and the secondorder elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996) . Some authors use continuous measures for the electoral cycle variable (Marsh, 1998) . Since there are very few cases, we used a discrete variable with three categories: the "honeymoon" period, i.e., until twelve months after the prior legislative election ; the "midterm" period, i.e., from thirteen to thirty six months after the prior legislative election; the "later term" period, i.e., from thirty seven to forty eight months after the prior legislative election. Remember that in Portugal normal national government terms are four years (forty eight months), except if for any (special) reason the president calls for early elections.
The third major issue to be solved before moving on to empirical tests relates to the expected political consequences for national governments in second-order elections that take place during different phases of the national electoral cycle, in terms of citizens' electoral behaviour. For the "midterm" period there is a large consensus in the literature, with most of the authors considering that governmental parties will tend to lose vote share in second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996) . In terms of the honeymoon period (sometimes concurrent elections), some authors defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in second-order elections as they did in prior first-order ones (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975) . Others defend that since second-order elections that take place during the honeymoon period have hardly any consequences for national governments, voters will tend to cast "sincere votes" Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996) . Therefore, larger parties in government and opposition will tend to lose vote share to smaller parties in multiparty systems. Finally, the later term period is for some authors a period of a certain recovery in national government popularity, and so parties controlling national cabinets will tend to lose less votes than in midterm elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b) . However, others defend that since second-order elections tend to better fulfill their function as markers of public opinion support for government the closer they fall to the next first-order election (later term), voters will tend to cast more "protest votes" in those periods Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996) . Therefore, according to these authors, parties in control of government will also tend to lose votes in second-order elections if they take place in the later term of the national cycle. controlling national government always lose electoral support (in terms of share of the vote) from the first-order elections to the subsequent second-order ones (Table 4) . From the late eighties through the mid-nineties these losses have always been very high, greater than 15 percentage points; in the 2004 EP elections very high losses for national government were back again (-15.6) . Midterm losses are always higher than later term losses, as expected. However, since there is only one case for second-order elections in the later term, it is not possible to derive any conclusions from this data. The same is true for the honeymoon period, where there are only three cases, so here too it is not possible to derive any conclusions. From the few cases there are in the honeymoon period, a kind of "bandwagon effect" seems to be in place for 1979 and 1985, but in the other election (1987) the "sincere vote effect" seems to be in place.
Does the decline in a government's popularity correlate with the decline in vote share in the second-order elections? The measure of government's popularity is the national government's level of popularity in the month of the second-order election (see notes in Table 4 ), similar to the one used by Tufte (1975) . Note that we only have survey data on governments' popularity from 1986 to 2004 (see Sources in Table 5 ).
In the present study, government popularity is an index calculated from the responses to a question on government's performance evaluation, calculated according analyses, and also to some scarcity of voter survey data, specially for local elections, we believe that it nevertheless provides an interesting test for many of the theoretical claims made in the literature on second-order elections.
First, as expected from theories of second-order elections, small and mediumsized parties perform better in second-order elections than in first-order ones. Mediumsized parties perform better in all second-order elections, but the differences are larger and statistically significant only when we compare local and legislative elections.
Small-sized parties only perform better in EP elections than in legislative ones, but not in local electoral races. Finally, larger parties do perform better in first-order than in second-order elections, but the differences are larger in the case of the comparison between legislative and European elections; moreover, only in this case are the differences statistically significant. Sometimes the differences between parties' performance in different types of elections are not very impressive. We believe that these relatively minor differences are partly due to some institutional contingencies:
average district magnitude differences and resource requirements for electoral campaigns. In terms of district magnitude, legislative elections are those which might benefit smaller (and medium sized) parties the most, largely because of the huge Lisbon and Porto districts. However, in EP elections the single district is not small (25 seats) specially compared to the average district magnitude in legislative elections (10, 5) . The same can not be said about local elections, where districts are usually rather small.
Moreover, in terms of resources (human, financial, etc.) needed for the electoral campaigns, EP elections are those that benefit smaller and medium-sized parties the most, followed by legislative -20 constituencies -and local elections -308
constituencies. So, institutional constraints can clearly explain why small parties perform better in EP elections than in legislative ones, but not in local contests.
However, the performance of medium-sized parties is not explained by institutional constraints: better performances are found in local elections. So, in the latter case this phenomena might be due to political parties' electoral fiefs, specially strong in the case of PCP -recall that this is the medium size party that usually performs better in local elections . In any case we believe that these issues are worth a closer look with comparative case designs and with more case studies.
Portugal emerges as a very interesting case because the changes in party system format that occurred in first-order elections were mirrored in second-order elections.
Since 1987, there is a majoritarian drive in legislative elections, such that the party system exhibits a clear trend towards greater bipolarization. Despite a slight time lag, the same trend is present in second-order contests. One outcome of this trend towards bipolarization in both first-order and second-order elections is that it erodes the specificities of second-order elections: the expected better performance of small and medium-sized parties in the latter type of electoral contests.
Other findings about electoral change in first-order and second-order elections resulted rather mixed. At the aggregate level, electoral volatility (TV or BV) was almost always greater in first-order than in second-order elections, contrary to our expectations.
However, individual level data revealed that, depending on the political conjuncture and, most likely, on the relative weight of pressures for tactical voting, voters are sometimes more prone to cross the left-right boundary in second-order elections than in first-order ones, as expected, although this is sometimes due to differential turnout; in other occasions and circumstances, the reverse is true (as the data for 1999 and 2004 revealed). The article concludes that the differences found between the aggregate and the individual level are probably due to the limitations in the aggregate measures of volatility. However, since we do not have many surveys to test these questions, that it is a line of inquiry worthy of pursuing further, with other comparative and case studies.
In Portugal, as elsewhere, second-order elections are used by voters to express their discontent with national governments. Furthermore, losses in national governments' electoral support between first and second-order elections are dependent not only on a government's popularity, but also on national economic conditions.
Portuguese electoral data revealed that the influence of national factors in second-order elections is not only evident in the short term but also in the long termi.e. in terms of changes in the party system. Also, the increasing similarity between first and second-order elections, namely in terms of aggregate party system developments, means that the second-order elections model might be losing some of its heuristic value in Portugal.
However, this does not mean that local and supranational factors are not also important in local and EP elections, respectively, but that national factors have an important, persistent and structural impact on second-order elections.
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